



A new algorithm to optimize a can-order inventory policy for two companies in a horizontal partnership

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Agenda

- Horizontal cooperation: what, why, how?
- Examples of horizontal cooperations
- Definitions & assumptions
- Problem Setting Example
- Costs & Performance Measures
- Methodology
- Numerical Example
- Future research

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Horizontal Cooperation

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Horizontal Cooperation

- **What** = cooperation where companies bundle their orders/join shipments
- **Why** = to reduce transport costs, CO2 emissions, and congestion
- **How** = by using the available space in truck hauls of one company to ship items of another company
- Vertical cooperation = cooperation with companies at different level of the supply chain (e.g., supplier & buyers)
- Horizontal cooperation = cooperation with companies at the same level of the supply chain

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Examples of Horizontal Cooperation



Examples of Horizontal Cooperation



Examples of Horizontal Cooperation



P&G



Nestlé



pepsi



Baxter

Examples of Horizontal Cooperation



Tupperware

P&G

What do we observe?

1. Horizontal cooperations can be established even with competitors!
2. Horizontal cooperations often only have 2 partners.



Baxter

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Definitions & Assumptions

- Assumptions:
 - Two companies
 - Both companies adopt a (S, c, s) can-order policy to synchronize their orders
 - No replenishment lead time
 - Unit Poisson demand (iid for both companies)



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 - Two companies
 - Both companies adopt a (S, c, s) can-order policy to synchronize their orders
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- Definitions:
 - I_i = the inventory level at company i
 - S_i = the order-up to level of company i
 - c_i = the can-order level of company i
 - s_i = the reorder-point of company i
 - λ_i = the Poisson arrival rate of customers at company i



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

Problem Setting Example ($t = t_0$)





Problem Setting Example ($t = t_1$)





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

Problem Setting Example ($t = t_2$)





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

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
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
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

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

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

Problem Setting Example ($t = t_x$)




Problem Setting Example ($t = t_{x+1}$)



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 - The average inventory at company i
 - ⇒ The inventory holding cost for both companies
- ⇒ The total cost for both company given their (S, c, s) policy

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- **How:**
 1. Evaluate the performance of a single (S,c,s) policy
 2. enumerate all policies in order to find the optimal policy
- **Available methodologies:**
 - Simulation
 - Markov chains
 - A new approach?

Methodology

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- Markov chains:
 - State space can be represented by double (I_1, I_2)
 - State-space size is $(S_1 \times S_2)$
 - For $S_1 = S_2 = 1,000$, the number of states equals 1,000,000

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- A new approach:
 - Also uses a Markov chain
 - State-space size is at most $(S_1 + S_2)$
 - For $S_1 = S_2 = 1,000$, the number of states equals at most 2,000

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 - ⇒ 500 times smaller!

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
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
Assume we start from a “full” system

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- There is a 10% probability that the next customer visits **company 1**
- There is a 90% probability that the next customer visits **company 2**

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Law of competing
exponentials

x


y

$\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$

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

x

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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λ_2

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
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
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c_i	2	2
s_i	0	0
λ_i	1	9



Law of competing exponentials


x

y

$\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$

$\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$

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
x

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
x

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


Law of competing exponentials

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
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
x

y

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Law of competing exponentials

x

y


λ_1

$\lambda_1 + \lambda_2$

λ_2

$\lambda_1 + \lambda_2$

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Law of competing exponentials


x

y

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Law of competing exponentials


x

y

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Law of competing exponentials


x

y

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Law of competing exponentials


x

y


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Law of competing exponentials


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
x

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
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y

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Law of competing exponentials


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
x

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
x

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
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
x

y

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
x

y

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
x

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
x

y

$\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$


$\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$

Company	1	2
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Regular states (visit probability obtained using binomial distribution)

Company	1	2
S_i	4	6
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s_i	0	0
λ_i	1	9



Law of competing exponentials

x


y

$\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$


$\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$

Final states (visit probability obtained using negative binomial distribution)

Company	1	2
S_i	4	6
C_i	2	2
s_i	0	0
λ_i	1	9




Law of competing exponentials



The diagram illustrates the Law of competing exponentials. It shows two boxes, one labeled x (light blue) and one labeled y (light purple). From box y , two arrows branch out: a purple arrow pointing up and a blue arrow pointing down. The purple arrow points to the fraction $\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$. The blue arrow points to the fraction $\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$.

Initial states (visit probability obtained using negative binomial distribution)

Company	1	2
S_i	4	6
c_i	2	2
s_i	0	0
λ_i	1	9




Law of competing exponentials

x


y


$\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$


$\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$





Initial states (visit probability obtained using negative binomial distribution)



















We have a Markov chain that holds the probabilities to move from one **initial state towards another**

[illegible]


We have a Markov chain that holds the probabilities to move from one **initial** state towards another




From this Markov chain, we can obtain the steady-state probabilities to visit one of the **initial** states!




We can use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **regular** state when departing from a given **initial** state




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


We can use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **regular** state when departing from a given **initial** state




Recall that the visit probabilities of the **regular states** can easily be obtained using the binomial distribution

We can use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **regular** state when departing from a given **initial** state




We obtain the steady-state probabilities to visit any of the **regular** states as the weighted sum of probabilities to visit the **regular** states when departing from a given **initial** state



Recall that the visit probabilities of the **regular** states can easily be obtained using the binomial distribution

We can use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **regular** state when departing from a given **initial** state




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
Using the steady-state probabilities to visit the **regular** states, we can easily calculate the expected inventory at each company

Recall that the visit probabilities of the **regular** states can easily be obtained using the binomial distribution


We can also use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **final** state when departing from an **initial** state



We can also use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **final** state when departing from an **initial** state




We can also use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **final** state when departing from an **initial** state



Recall that the visit probabilities of the **final states** can easily be obtained using the negative binomial distribution

We can also use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **final** state when departing from an **initial** state




Again, we obtain the steady-state probabilities to visit any of the **final** states as the weighted sum of probabilities to visit the **final** states when departing from a given **initial** state



Recall that the visit probabilities of the **final** states can easily be obtained using the negative binomial distribution

We can also use these steady-state probabilities to weigh the probability to visit a **final** state when departing from an **initial** state



Again, we obtain the steady-state probabilities to visit any of the **final** states as the weighted sum of probabilities to visit the **final** states when departing from a given **initial** state

Given the number of transitions it takes to move from an **initial** state to a **final** state, we can calculate the number of times a company places a single/joined order

Recall that the visit probabilities of the **final** states can easily be obtained using the negative binomial distribution

Numerical Example: Conclusions

- If we use a regular Markov chain to model the example:
 - We end up with 24 states
 - We cannot easily calculate the number of orders (joined/single) for each company
- If we use our new approach:
 - We end up with a Markov chain of 5 states
 - We can easily obtain both inventory holding costs and order costs (i.e., the total cost of the coordination)

Agenda

- Horizontal cooperation: what, why, how?
- Examples of horizontal cooperations
- Definitions & assumptions
- Problem Setting Example
- Costs & Performance Measures
- Methodology
- Numerical Example
- **Future research**

Future/Current Research

- We can use our model to investigate/compare the costs in a coordination and the standalone costs (cfr. Valeria's talk next session)

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- Because our model is fast/efficient, we can use it to study the characteristics of the optimal policy in a two-company horizontal cooperation

Future/Current Research

- We can use our model to investigate/compare the costs in a coordination and the standalone costs (cfr. Valeria's talk next session)
- Because our model is fast/efficient, we can use it to study the characteristics of the optimal policy in a two-company horizontal cooperation
- Lastly, we also relax the assumptions:
 - Non-zero & non-exponential lead times
 - Non-exponential customer interarrival times
 - (S, c, Q) order policy
 - Truck capacity constraints

